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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE REMOVAL POWER 
Ganesh Sitaraman∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In the years leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, financial institu-
tions targeted communities of color with expensive and risky subprime 
mortgage products.  Hundreds of thousands of Black and Hispanic  
families were charged more for mortgages than their white counterparts 
or steered into expensive subprime loans, even though they qualified for 
cheaper prime loans.1  Over time, financial institutions like Countrywide 
pushed these “toxic” loans on more and more homeowners and expanded 
subprime lending throughout the country.2  When the music finally 
stopped in 2008, millions of families lost their jobs and their homes,  
and nearly $11 trillion in household wealth was wiped out.3  Over the 
next two years, Congress would work to pass financial reform legislation 
that was designed to address a variety of risks and dangers in the finan-
cial markets. 
In 2007, then-Professor Elizabeth Warren proposed a federal agency 
to regulate consumer financial products.4  For years, Warren had criti-
cized predatory “tricks and traps” in mortgages, credit cards, and other 
financial products.5  One-off, piecemeal reforms had failed, and  
Americans were drowning in debt.6  Increasingly, one bad medical di-
agnosis or the loss of a job would mean bankruptcy and a family’s total 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Professor of Law and Director, Program in Law and Government, Vanderbilt Law School. 
Thanks to Rebecca Allensworth, Kate Andrias, Jed Britton-Purdy, Jessica Clarke, Dan Epps, Joey 
Fishkin, Gautam Hans, Amy Kapczynski, Daryl Levinson, Adam Levitin, David Lewis, Leah  
Litman, Bill Marshall, Lev Menand, Gillian Metzger, Tim Meyer, David Pozen, Ed Rubin, J.B. 
Ruhl, Chris Serkin, Dan Sharfstein, Suzanna Sherry, Reva Siegel, Chris Slobogin, Kevin Stack, 
David Strauss, Mike Vandenbergh, Adam Winkler, Ingrid Wuerth, and participants in workshops 
at the University of North Carolina Law School and Wharton Legal Studies and Business Ethics 
Department for comments and suggestions.  Thanks also to Cloe Anderson, Meredith Capps, and 
Madeleine Carpenter for helpful research assistance. 
 1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Reaches $335 Million Settlement to 
Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21, 
2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-335-million-settlement-resolve-
allegations-lending-discrimination [https://perma.cc/6U2N-7HLY]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Just., Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo Resulting in More than $175  
Million in Relief for Homeowners to Resolve Fair Lending Claims (July 12, 2012),  
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-settlement-wells-fargo-resulting-more-
175-million-relief [https://perma.cc/4VEN-7K4E].  
 2 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 104–05 (2011).  
 3 Id. at xv.  
 4 Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, no. 5, Summer 2007,  
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate [https://perma.cc/27NQ-XFXY].  
 5 See id. 
 6 See id. 
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economic devastation.  Warren argued that other consumer products, 
like toasters, were regulated at the federal level.7  Financial products 
were not so different.  By 2009, Congress and the President picked up 
Warren’s proposal, and they made it one of the central parts of the com-
ing financial reform package.8 
That is when the opposition kicked into gear.  For the next decade, 
opponents of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) waged 
an all-out war against the agency, dumping millions of dollars into ef-
forts to stop the agency from coming into being.9  When they failed to 
prevent its creation, they switched gears to slow its functioning.  And 
when the Trump Administration gained control of the CFPB, it began 
to dismantle the agency from the inside.10  As with the Affordable Care 
Act, this Obama Administration achievement faced a sustained and re-
lentless assault on its very existence. 
A reader of Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection  
Bureau,11 however, would have little sense of the bruising, bare-knuckle, 
decade-long fight over the agency.  Instead, the case presents itself as 
posing a relatively straightforward, albeit novel-on-the-facts, separation 
of powers question: Is it constitutional for Congress to create an agency 
headed by a single director who is insulated from presidential removal, 
except in cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”?12 
A summary is simple: In 2017, the CFPB issued a demand for Seila 
Law LLC to produce information on its business practices, as part of 
the agency’s investigation of the law firm for violating telemarketing 
laws.13  Seila refused, arguing that the CFPB single-director structure 
with for-cause removal violated the separation of powers.14  The CFPB 
filed suit to enforce its demand.15  Writing for three Justices, with two 
others concurring in the judgment, Chief Justice Roberts agreed with 
Seila and found the agency’s design unconstitutional, in the process set-
ting up a framework that appears to allow Congress to condition re-
moval from office for members of multimember commissions but not for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See id. 
 8 See Edmund L. Andrews, Banks Balk at Agency Meant to Aid Consumers, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 30, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/business/economy/01regulate.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6FUH-MUDE]. 
 9 See infra section I.A, pp. 358–64. 
 10 See infra section I.C, pp. 371–73.  
 11 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). 
 12 Id. at 2193 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018)). 
 13 See id. at 2194 (citing CFPB v. Seila Law, LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01081, 2017 WL 6536586, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017)). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id.  By the time the case came to the Supreme Court, the Trump Administration had agreed 
with Seila on the merits of the constitutional question, so the Court appointed Paul Clement as 
amicus to argue the case for the CFPB’s constitutionality.  See id. at 2195.  
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single-director agency heads.16  At the same time, the Chief Justice wrote 
for seven Justices that the CFPB’s for-cause removal restriction was 
severable from the rest of the statute and that it alone would be  
struck17 — leaving the agency in place but now with a presidential re-
moval threat looming over its director. 
Justice Kagan dissented from the constitutional analysis, along with 
the three other liberal Justices.  In an opinion filled with sharp, cutting 
language, Justice Kagan protested that there was nothing neutral about 
the majority’s reasoning or its unitary executive theory of the separation 
of powers.  She systematically argued that “constitutional text, history, 
and precedent invalidate[] the majority’s thesis.”18  Justice Kagan even 
accused the majority of “gerrymander[ing]” their “made up” rule to 
strike down the CFPB’s independent structure.19  For a separation of 
powers case, this was about as bloody a fight as it gets. 
But why? 
Seven Justices agreed that the CFPB can continue to regulate finan-
cial products, so long as its head is removable at will by the President.  
Seila, the law firm, is likely still subject to the investigatory demand 
because the Trump CFPB, now with a removable director, says it has 
ratified that demand.20  And Seila, the case, means that if Democratic 
nominee Joe Biden wins the White House in November, he can fire the 
Republican-appointed head of the CFPB and install a pro-regulatory 
appointee.  Given that this was one of the marquee cases of the 2019 
Term and that the decision broke 5–4 along ideological lines, these are 
hardly epochal consequences. 
Supreme Court cases are often seen as “political” because the first-
order effects of the decisions have self-evident political, partisan, or  
ideological consequences.  Bush v. Gore21 chose a President.  NFIB v. 
Sebelius22 could have overturned a President’s namesake healthcare in-
itiative.  This Term’s cases on abortion23 and the President’s taxes24 have 
obvious “political” valence.  On an initial glance, Seila is different.  The 
first-order consequences of the decision are not self-evidently political.  
The decision does not invalidate the Consumer Financial Protection  
Bureau as a whole or strip it of any substantive powers.  It does not 
favor the Trump Administration, as President Trump already has his 
handpicked head of the CFPB in place.  It does not favor Republican 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See id. at 2199, 2201. 
 17 Id. at 2211. 
 18 Id. at 2240 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 19 Id. at 2225.  
 20 See Ratification of Bureau Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. 41,330 (July 10, 2020) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R.). 
 21 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 22 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 23 See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020). 
 24 See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020); see also Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 
2019 (2020). 
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Presidents over Democratic ones in some more systematic way either: 
Presidents of either party could fire the head of the CFPB upon taking 
office and nominate a new one.  Indeed, even if Seila is a step toward 
overturning removal conditions altogether — making commissions like 
the FTC and FCC less independent — it is not clear that the first-order 
effects of that rule are “political” either.  Republican and Democratic 
Presidents alike might use their unitary executive power of removal to 
fire ideologically misaligned commissioners and choose ones more to 
their liking. 
My aim in this Comment is to offer something of a Rashomon25 of 
Seila to try to explain why Seila was so hotly contested, why it is a 
marquee case, and why it might be considered a “political” decision — 
in spite of the symmetrical first-order effects and limited consequences 
for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.26  Throughout this 
Comment, I use the word “political” in different ways, in order to ex-
plore how a case can be “political” beyond obvious first-order electoral 
consequences (as in Bush v. Gore) or policy consequences (as with NFIB 
v. Sebelius). 
The first story is of how Seila itself came to be.  It is not entirely 
clear why Seila was brought to the Supreme Court.  After the Court’s 
2010 decision in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight 
Board,27 it was predictable that the Court would likely hold that the 
remedy for an unconstitutional removal provision was simply to strike 
it and leave the agency in place.  So why bring the case if recovery was 
unlikely?  Part I provides the policy context for Seila, outlining the ori-
gins of the CFPB and the decade-long fight over its existence.  This 
context shows how the financial industry, political leaders, and others 
deployed a variety of tactics and arguments to try to kill or weaken the 
consumer agency.  Seila must be understood in this context.  It did not 
simply arise, as the Court suggested, from novel legislative design.  It 
was the culmination of a relentless antiregulatory oppositional campaign 
that began when Congress and the President took up Warren’s  
proposal — and that eventually turned into a constitutional battle. 
The second story places Seila within the context of the rise of the 
unitary executive theory.  Part II shows how the unitary theory went 
from virtually nonexistent in the 1970s to a major part of legal and 
scholarly debate by the 1990s and 2000s.  Its rise was not so much a 
function of popular constitutionalism in the form of a social movement 
or public opinion as it was elite efforts.  The unitary executive theory 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 25 RASHOMON (Minoru Jingo 1950) (depicting the same event through the perspectives of dif-
ferent characters). 
 26 This approach aligns with the law and political economy framework, which seeks to center 
issues of power, equality, and democracy rather than separating the market from politics.  See gen-
erally Jedediah Britton-Purdy et al., Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond 
the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784 (2020). 
 27 561 U.S. 477 (2010).  See infra section I.D, pp. 374–75, for a discussion. 
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gained steam through the initiative of conservative presidential admin-
istrations (Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush) and a systematic effort 
to articulate and defend the theory in legal scholarship.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’s straightforward, briefly reasoned opinion in Seila reflects the 
success of the conservative legal movement in making the theory plau-
sible.  Justice Kagan’s piercing dissent lays bare how contested this rea-
soning is.  Taken together, the conservative push for a unitary executive 
and the battle between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan should 
leave readers with the sense that the case is “political” in a different sense. 
The third story is one of values and consequences rather than histor-
ical context.  Given that the first-order consequences of Seila and of a 
presidential removal power are symmetrical for presidents of both po-
litical parties, are there “political” reasons why conservatives are so in-
terested in the presidential removal power?  And conversely, are there 
“political” reasons why liberals and progressives have been so opposed 
to it?  The opinion in Seila leaves traces of possible normative views of 
how the separation of powers should be enforced, which in turn point 
to some potentially larger ideological stakes.  In addition, scholars often 
reference the rise of the removal power as a danger to the administrative 
state, but it is unclear precisely through what mechanism this operates, 
given the first-order symmetry of the rule itself.  Part III canvasses these 
normative views and the mechanisms that might produce asymmetric 
consequences.  It is admittedly a speculative enterprise, but to the extent 
any of these normative views or policy consequences ring true (and they 
may not, or may not for everyone), they further indicate why Seila and 
the removal power should be considered deeply “political.” 
I.  THE ASSAULT ON THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL 
PROTECTION BUREAU 
In her 2007 article first making the case for a federal agency to reg-
ulate consumer financial products, then-Professor Warren described 
how financial institutions had engaged in a variety of unfair and pred-
atory practices.28  One-off regulatory solutions had not stopped lender 
kickbacks, product steering toward vulnerable communities, or tricks, 
traps, and obfuscation in financial agreements.29  Families were suffer-
ing as a result.  Warren thus argued for the creation of a new agency, 
akin to the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), that would 
regulate mortgages and other financial products just like the CPSC reg-
ulates toasters and other consumer goods.30 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 See Warren, supra note 4. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id.  
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Warren offered the CPSC as an analogy, but her focus was not on 
whether there should be a single-director agency or a multimember com-
mission.31  Rather, at that point, and throughout the fight to create the 
CFPB, she primarily wanted an agency that focused on products, rather 
than issuers, in order to prevent regulatory arbitrage; that would have a 
mission focused solely on consumer financial protection, rather than 
having multiple missions; and that would be strong and independent so 
it could evade industry capture.32  Importantly, she noted that the ulti-
mate effect of sound regulation would be to improve markets.33  As with 
food, drugs, and other consumer products, trust in the safety of the prod-
uct would make consumers more comfortable and markets more  
competitive.34 
The proposal immediately met with two reactions.  The first was 
that it would be effective.  A new agency with powers akin to other 
regulatory agencies could significantly improve the consumer financial 
product market.  The other thing Warren was told: “Don’t do it.”35  
“There is no possible way you can win,” people in Washington said, 
“because this is going to cost some big banks real money.”36  They cau-
tioned her that the biggest banks would “sweep through this town with 
their lobbyists, and you will end up with nothing.”37  Instead, they ad-
vised her to ask for “bunches of little things, and maybe you will get one 
or two things.”38  The warnings did not have their intended effect.   
Warren redoubled her efforts and began to mobilize support from as 
many groups and individuals as she could.39  The AFL-CIO, the AARP, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 Warren later commented that as the idea gained traction and she talked to experts about 
agency design, she quickly came to support a single-director structure.  Elizabeth Warren, The 
Banking Industry’s Transparent Attempt to Weaken the CFPB, HUFFPOST (Oct. 20, 2016, 5:41 
PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/banking-industrys-attempt-weaken-cfpb_b_8340792 [https:// 
perma.cc/R6M4-ARXB].  
 32 Warren, supra note 4.  For discussions of how the CFPB fulfilled these aims, see generally 
Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. 
L. REV. 15 (2010); Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 
32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321 (2013); Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Struc-
ture of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2543 (2019).  
 33 See Warren, supra note 4. 
 34 Id.  
 35 Kara Swisher & Walt Mossberg, The 30-Year “Sudden Explosion” of Senator Elizabeth  
Warren (Video), VOX: RECODE (June 10, 2015, 4:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/ 
6/10/11563396/the-30-year-sudden-explosion-of-sen-elizabeth-warren-video 
[https://perma.cc/L5C3-V3L4]. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id.  
 39 See id. 
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the NAACP, and others joined her,40 and together, they started to push 
for the agency.41 
A.  The Path to Passage 
When the Obama Administration offered its outline for financial re-
form in 2009,42 financial institutions immediately identified “killing” the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as their “top priority.”43  Accord-
ing to news reports, they vowed to fight the proposal “with everything 
they ha[d].”44  In September 2009, the Chamber of Commerce began a 
$2 million ad campaign opposing the reforms45 and even created a “Stop 
the CFPA” website.46  By March of 2010, with the CFPB having passed 
the House of Representatives and negotiations proceeding in the Senate, 
the Chamber announced it was “intensifying” its campaign against the 
CFPB.47  Its multimillion-dollar television, radio, online, and grassroots 
outreach effort had already generated nearly two hundred thousand let-
ters to Congress.48  That year, the financial sector ended up spending 
$481.2 million dollars lobbying,49 and it made $346.7 million in cam-
paign contributions in that year’s midterm elections.50  All in all, some 
three thousand lobbyists worked to kill or weaken parts of the Dodd-
Frank bill — almost six lobbyists for every member of Congress.51 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 See id. 
 41 There are a number of excellent accounts of the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act from partic-
ipants and journalists.  ELIZABETH WARREN, A FIGHTING CHANCE (2014) offers Warren’s own 
account of her efforts to get the CFPB passed into law.  ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: 
HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN’T (2013) is a jour-
nalistic account that uses the Dodd-Frank Act as a lens through which to see how Congress functions. 
 42 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 
55 (2009).  
 43 Andrews, supra note 8. 
 44 Id.; see KAISER, supra note 41, at 127, 131, 134–36 (discussing the banking lobby’s immediate 
opposition to the agency).  
 45 Brody Mullins, Chamber Ad Campaign Targets Consumer Agency, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 8, 2009, 
12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125236911298191113 [https://perma.cc/JT7P-56D2].  
 46 Earlier in the legislative process, the agency was called the Consumer Financial Protection 
Agency, rather than Bureau.  I refer to it throughout as Bureau or CFPB for simplicity. 
 47 Press Release, U.S. Chamber of Com., U.S. Chamber Intensifies Campaign for Bipartisan 
Financial Regulatory Reform (Mar. 25, 2010, 8:00 PM), https://www.uschamber.com/press- 
release/us-chamber-intensifies-campaign-bipartisan-financial-regulatory-reform 
[https://perma.cc/7JGR-8XY7].  
 48 Id.  
 49 Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Lobbying, 2019, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www. 
opensecrets.org/industries/lobbying.php?ind=F [https://perma.cc/29NH-X3F6].  
 50 Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?ind=F [https://perma.cc/FW92-8UQM] .  
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Opponents of the CFPB recognized the unpopularity of advocating 
against consumer protection.  After all, the proposal came in the wake 
of a historic economic crash that was rooted in practices designed to 
steer or trick consumers into expensive and risky financial products.  As 
a lobbyist for the Financial Services Roundtable admitted in the sum-
mer of 2009, “the optics are bad.”52  Financial industry lobbyists and 
their allies did not argue that their bottom lines would suffer from reg-
ulation.  Rather, they offered a variety of substantive arguments against 
the agency.  These arguments can be grouped into three categories. 
First were arguments denying the need for structural changes.  Some 
opponents argued that weak consumer financial products had little to 
do with the crash.53  Regulation of any kind, let alone structural regula-
tion, was therefore disconnected from the causes of the crisis.  Others 
conceded the need for reforms but suggested instead “beefed-up” powers 
for existing regulatory agencies.54  Still others suggested placing a new 
office within the FDIC55 or creating a council of existing regulators.56  
These arguments allowed opponents of the CFPB to claim the high 
ground in supporting regulation, while effectively minimizing change 
and keeping the existing (and flawed) structures in place. 
The second category included technocratic consequentialist argu-
ments.  Arguments of this type were not actually a case against a new 
agency.  They were a case against hypothetical regulations that might 
emerge from a new agency.  Opponents of the new agency thus argued 
that it might harm small businesses57 and increase the costs of loans and 
other financial products.58  At one point in spring of 2010, they even 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 See Andrews, supra note 8.  
 53 The Editors, The Case Against the Dodd Bill, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 26, 2010, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/04/case-against-dodd-bill-editors [https://perma.cc/E8CY-
54FM]; Duncan Currie, Getting Financial Reform Right, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 25, 2010, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.nationalreview.com/2010/03/getting-financial-reform-right-duncan-currie 
[https://perma.cc/VY58-PK89] (“I don’t see consumer protection as being at all part of the problem 
we are trying to fix.” (quoting John Cochrane)). 
 54 R. Christian Bruce, Regulatory Reform: Summers Urges Speed on Bank Reforms, Says Con-
sumer Protection Agency Essential, 93 BANKING REP. (BNA) No. 10, at 506 (Sept. 22, 2009) (“[T]he 
Consumer Bankers Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, and 23 other business groups 
said creating a stand-alone consumer protection agency with broad powers ‘is not the correct ap-
proach.’  Instead . . . existing regulatory agencies could be given beefed-up powers.”). 
 55 See Victoria McGrane, Consumer Agency Fight Continues, POLITICO (Mar. 1, 2010, 3:20 
PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/03/consumer-agency-fight-continues-033706 [https:// 
perma.cc/E4FA-Z9L4 ]. 
 56 See U.S. Chamber of Com., supra note 47.  
 57 U.S. Chamber of Com., The Proposed CFPA Will Disproportionately Harm Small Businesses, 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/chambers/files/ 
proposedcfpawilldisproportionatelyharmsmallbusinesses.pdf [https://perma.cc/J98C-85D2].  
 58 James Gattuso, Senator Dodd’s Regulation Plan: Fourteen Fatal Flaws, HERITAGE FOUND. 
(Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.heritage.org/markets-and-finance/report/senator-dodds-regulation-
plan-14-fatal-flaws [https://perma.cc/TK7L-8DDW]. 
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alleged that the CFPB would regulate orthodontists who offer payment 
plans for parents whose kids need braces.59  Still others claimed the pro-
posal would create “a fragmented system of regulation,” even though it 
was designed to do the opposite.60  This mix of tradeoffs, misdirection, 
and fearmongering was common throughout 2009 and 2010, and it ap-
peared to be designed at a minimum to shrink the scope of the CFPB’s 
authority — and at a maximum to sow the seeds of doubt among fence-
sitters about the need for a new agency with a broad mandate. 
The third category included structural consequentialist arguments.61  
These usually came in two flavors, both with hefty libertarian impulses.  
The first was that a new agency would be a “paternalistic,” “elitist,” 
“financial nanny” that undermined freedom and individual liberty.62  
The agency, these terrified opponents claimed, would “for the first time” 
ever in the history of the country prevent people from buying products 
and services that are not inherently dangerous.63  This was, of course, 
manifestly incorrect, as federal regulation has long restricted the sale of 
many kinds of products that are not inherently dangerous.  The point, 
however, seems to have been to activate libertarian impulses toward in-
dividual freedom. 
The second flavor were arguments that framed the agency as a ty-
rannical, authoritarian apparatus that had “unchecked powers and mas-
sive authority over the economy.”64  Senator Mike Enzi, for example, 
said that the agency would become the “single most powerful agency in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 Chris Frates, Banks Will Accept Consumer Agency, POLITICO (Apr. 17, 2010, 6:26 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2010/04/banks-will-accept-consumer-agency-035948 
[https://perma.cc/LT5S-F3K9]; Chris Frates, GOP Chips Away at Wall St. Bill, POLITICO (May 9, 
2010, 6:42 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2010/05/gop-chips-away-at-wall-st-bill-036983 
[https://perma.cc/74SG-FXQH].  
 60 U.S. Chamber of Com., supra note 47. 
 61 On the difference between technocratic and structural thinking and reform generally, see, for 
example, GANESH SITARAMAN, THE GREAT DEMOCRACY 51–52 (2019); GANESH 
SITARAMAN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNBUNDLING “TOO BIG TO FAIL” 10–11 (2014), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/TooBigToFail-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7TX-S5TS].  
 62 See, e.g., Peter J. Wallison, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency, AM. ENTER. INST. 
(July 14, 2009), https://www.aei.org/articles/the-consumer-financial-protection-agency [https:// 
perma.cc/6Q7R-22V7]; Peter J. Wallison, Elitist Protection Consumers Don’t Need, AM. ENTER. 
INST. (July 13, 2009), https://www.aei.org/articles/elitist-protection-consumers-dont-need 
[https://perma.cc/JKW4-GRDM]; Anthony Dick, Re: Financial Nanny, NAT’L REV. (July 8, 2009, 
3:54 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/re-financial-nanny-anthony-dick [https:// 
perma.cc/Y8VG-YB94].  
 63 Wallison, Elitist Protection Consumers Don’t Need, supra note 62. 
 64 U.S. Chamber of Com., supra note 47.  Language of this type is an example of what Professor 
Gillian Metzger has called “rhetorical anti-administrativism.”  Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme 
Court, 2016 Term — Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 34–38 (2017).  
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the Federal Government” and would exercise “unchecked power.”65  
Claims of “unchecked power” were also manifestly incorrect.  At a min-
imum, the proposed CFPB would have been subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking and ju-
dicial review.66  The idea that the agency would somehow be the most 
powerful agency in the federal government was also far-fetched, to say 
the least.  Competitors might include the Justice Department, which can 
prosecute and incarcerate; the Federal Reserve, which can crash the 
economy in setting monetary policy; and the Federal Trade Commission, 
whose powers include regulating “unfair or deceptive acts or practices 
in or affecting commerce”67 — a power much broader than the CFPB’s 
authority to address unfair and abusive practices related to a “consumer 
financial product or service.”68  The value of these arguments seems not 
to have been precision in the possible harms but the crafting of a liber-
tarian, road-to-serfdom narrative of the slippery slope of governmental 
power.  This narrative, like the broccoli argument in the adjacent health 
care debate,69 would ultimately migrate from public debate into the legal 
arena and take on a constitutional valence. 
Importantly, so far as I can tell, at no time in the legislative debates 
did a member of Congress argue that the CFPB’s design was unconsti-
tutional.  Searching the House and Senate debates for references to the 
constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the CFPB turns up not a sin-
gle reference.70  The debate over the agency — even with heated rhetoric 
that trended toward absurdity — was fundamentally political, eco-
nomic, and ideological, not constitutional. 
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With these arguments in place, the debate was polarized from the 
start.  Representative Barney Frank led the House effort to create the 
CFPB, and he supported a single-director agency from the beginning.71  
But he initially lacked the votes for that design, so he adopted a com-
mission structure.72  Every Republican on the Energy and Commerce 
Committee voted against the agency in committee and every Republican 
in the House of Representatives voted against the overall bill in the fall 
of 2009.73  One conservative commentator said that when it came to the 
House bill, “[t]he bad can be summed up in four words: Consumer  
Financial Protection Agency.”74 
The Senate took up the bill in the spring of 2010.75  “[T]he fighting 
was intense,” said former (and later) law professor Michael Barr, who 
was then heading up financial reform at the Treasury Department.76  
There were fears that the publicly popular CFPB would not get a vote 
in the Senate because senators did not want to vote for it and anger the 
banks or vote against it and anger their constituents.  Warren pushed 
hard for a clean, public vote on the agency,77 and she announced her 
intention to fight efforts to water down the agency into a fig leaf reform 
without serious authority.  “My first choice is a strong consumer agency,” 
she said at the time.78  “My second choice is no agency at all and plenty 
of blood and teeth left on the floor.”79  And, she noted, “My 99th choice 
is some mouthful of mush that doesn’t get the job done.”80  Aware of the 
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two sides behind the legislative negotiations, Rolling Stone framed the 
fight as “Elizabeth Warren vs. Wall Street.”81 
Republicans in the Senate used all three arguments against the 
CFPB in combination, and they emphasized new ones as well.  Senator 
Bob Corker, for example, worried that consumer protection would not 
be coordinated with financial stability and proposed creating a veto for 
CFPB rules.82  The American Bankers Association supported this posi-
tion as a way to weaken the agency, even though it had opposed linking 
consumer protection and financial stability a mere four years earlier.83  
Back then, decoupling these functions had been proposed to strengthen 
consumer protection.84  Warren called out this hypocrisy as proof that 
the banks’ only consistent principle was opposition to regulation.85 
Navigating these political waters, Senator Chris Dodd, who was 
leading financial reform efforts in the Senate, adopted a variation on 
Corker’s proposal.86  The final Dodd bill involved a single-director 
agency located within the Federal Reserve, and it gave the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council a limited veto over some of the CFPB’s reg-
ulations, making the CFPB the only agency with such a check.87  Some 
liberals worried the Dodd bill was too weak because of the inclusion of 
the veto provision.88  But even with the accommodation to Senator 
Corker, the CFPB’s creation remained “the most contentious issue” in 
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the debate.89  According to Corker, the agency’s inclusion prevented any 
Republicans from agreeing to financial reform.90 
With the CFPB in the Dodd bill, Republicans proposed an amend-
ment on the Senate floor — now to reduce the agency’s powers and 
place it within the FDIC.91  Warren observed that the “lobbyists’ closest 
friends in the Senate would like nothing better than passing an agency 
that has a good name but no real impact so they have something good 
to say to the voters — and something even better to say to the lobby-
ists.”92  Nonetheless, the consumer agency wouldn’t die.93  The last-ditch 
efforts to kill it failed.  With Dodd’s bill having the votes to pass in the 
Senate, Frank immediately agreed to a single-director structure in con-
ference committee, as it had always been his preference.94  President 
Obama signed the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau into law 
on July 21, 2010.95 
B.  Halftime 
“Halftime.”  That’s what the head lobbyist for the Financial Services 
Roundtable called it when the Dodd-Frank Act passed.96  The financial 
industry and Republicans understood that even though they had lost the 
first legislative battle, the war over financial regulation would continue 
in Congress, in the agencies, and ultimately, in the courts. 
1.  Money and Influence. — Financial institutions ramped up their 
lobbying efforts and campaign spending.  In 2012, the financial industry 
spent $749 million on campaign contributions, shifting from a roughly 
even split funding both parties in prior cycles to spending almost seventy 
percent of their contributions on Republicans.97  That was on top of $490 
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million in lobbying expenses.98  To get a sense of the size and scope of 
the lobbying effort, consider this: in 2012, the top five consumer advo-
cacy groups had twenty lobbyists in Washington.  The top five financial 
industry groups had 406 — just about one per member of Congress.99  
And those numbers undercount the extensive additional resources that 
financial industry lobbyists had at their disposal in the form of research-
ers, PR consultants, and regulatory lawyers.100  By the 2015–2016 cycle, 
the sector was spending more than $2 billion between contributions and 
lobbying — amounting to $2.7 million a day.101 
The consequences of these resource imbalances were real.  Consumer 
groups had 116 meetings with regulatory agencies in the years after 
Dodd-Frank was passed; the top five commercial banks met with them 
901 times.102  A study that looked into the relationship between money 
and policy found that members of Congress who voted for rolling back 
financial reforms got two to four times as much in campaign contribu-
tions from Wall Street PACs than did those who held the line and pro-
tected reform.103  At the time, Dennis Kelleher, the head of the financial 
reform group Better Markets, asked, “How do you compete when one 
side is this hydra-headed monster that can devote unlimited resources 
to killing, gutting or otherwise weakening financial reform?”104 
The fight against the CFPB continued in public as well.  In 2015, 
the heads of six big trade associations — the American Bankers  
Association, American Land Title Association, Consumer Bankers  
Association, Credit Union National Association, Independent Community 
Bankers Association, and National Association of Federal Credit  
Unions — penned a joint op-ed again calling for restructuring the 
agency.105  A $500,000 television ad campaign, funded by a group whose 
board included lobbyists for the student loan giant Naviant (which was 
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sued by the CFPB), framed the agency as something from the authori-
tarian Soviet Union.106  In the ad, bureaucratic drones deny loan appli-
cations in a massive room, with giant red banners featuring the faces of 
by-then Senator Warren and then-Director Richard Cordray hanging in 
the background.107  In the eyes of opponents, the Director was a “politi-
cally biased regulatory dictator” (that was an industry op-ed in the Wall 
Street Journal).108  The agency’s textbook rulemaking powers amounted 
to “mak[ing] up laws as it goes along” and were “counter to the American 
system of limited government” (that was a commentator at the Heritage 
Foundation).109  The Republican Party platform in 2016 even declared 
that the CFPB was a “rogue agency” with “dictatorial powers.”110   
Importantly, framing the fight as restructuring to prevent a “dictatorial” 
agency enabled opponents to avoid attacking the agency itself or its ac-
tions, both of which remained popular.111 
2.  Confirmation Wars. — Republican senators also took the extraor-
dinary action of preventing the agency from having a confirmed leader.  
Forty-four Republicans declared on May 5, 2011, that they would block 
the confirmation of any person as director of the CFPB until structural 
changes were enacted into law.112  “No Accountability, No Confirmation” 
was the headline adopted by Senator Richard Shelby’s office.113  Senator 
Shelby himself claimed, incorrectly, that the agency has “unfettered au-
thority to regulate businesses that extend consumer credit.”114  By July, 
the Chamber of Commerce had produced a twenty-seven-page state-
ment systematically arguing that the CFPB’s director would have “un-
precedented unchecked power of extraordinary breadth” and calling for 
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structural reforms.115  The Chamber stopped short of calling the 
agency’s structure unconstitutional, but it sang a constitutional tune, 
referring to “checks and balances” eight times.116 
In the face of intransigent Republican opposition, President Obama 
chose not to nominate then-Professor Warren to run the CFPB in July 
2011, and instead picked former Ohio Attorney General Richard 
Cordray with the hope he might pass muster with Republicans in the 
Senate.117  A few months later, in December 2011, Republicans used the 
threat of a filibuster to block Cordray’s nomination, citing once again 
their demands for structural reforms to the agency.118 
The confirmation battle over Cordray wasn’t important simply as a 
matter of political hardball.  It was also a tactic to prevent the regulation 
of financial institutions.  A legal opinion from the Treasury and Federal 
Reserve Inspectors General had concluded that without a confirmed 
head, the CFPB could not exercise its powers to conduct rulemakings 
under its new legal authorities; take action to prohibit unfair, deceptive, 
and abusive practices; or supervise nondepository financial institu-
tions.119  In other words, the CFPB would not get its full powers without 
having a Senate-confirmed leader.120 
Playing political hardball himself, President Obama ultimately gave 
recess appointments to Cordray and three others in January 
2012,121 leading to lawsuits and ultimately the Supreme Court’s decision 
in NLRB v. Noel Canning122 (which, like Seila, does not go into the fe-
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rocious political battles being waged between the branches and the eco-
nomic stakes behind them).123  Only after Senate Democrats threatened to 
change the filibuster rules in July 2013 was Cordray finally confirmed.124 
3.  New Legislation and Weaponized Oversight. — After Republicans 
captured the House of Representatives in 2010, they began a multi-year 
effort to weaken and roll back the agency’s authority, introducing new 
legislation and weaponizing their oversight powers.125  Almost immedi-
ately upon taking the House, Republicans introduced multiple pieces of 
legislation designed to make the CFPB a multimember commission, to 
strengthen the veto over the CFPB’s rulemakings, and to subject the 
agency to congressional appropriations rather than getting its funding 
from the Fed’s budget.126  On the first anniversary of Dodd-Frank, the 
House passed major reforms to the CFPB.127 
Over the coming years, new legislative proposals to weaken the 
agency got bolder and more creative.  One bill would have eliminated 
most of the CFPB’s supervisory and enforcement powers, ended its  
independent funding source, made the agency’s public consumer com-
plaint database secret, halted its authority to regulate small loans like 
payday lending, reduced the pay of agency employees, and, of course, 
made the director removable at will.128  Another would have prevented 
the agency from collecting loan data on small and minority businesses, 
and replaced the notice-and-comment rulemaking process with a more 
cumbersome one that has been shown to lengthen the rulemaking pro-
cess by more than five times.129  At one point, Republicans also proposed 
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using budget reconciliation to end independent funding for the agency.130  
All told, between 2011 and 2017, Republicans introduced 135 bills and 
resolutions designed to hamper or kill the agency.131  Importantly, many 
of these proposals took aim at areas in which the CFPB had been  
successful, such as its enforcement actions against Wells Fargo and its 
consumer complaint hotline.132 
At the same time, House Republicans used their oversight powers in 
extraordinary ways, weaponizing them to tie up the agency and its lead-
ership in paperwork, legal battles, and invented scandals.  They (and 
the Chamber of Commerce) attacked the CFPB for the cost of renovat-
ing its headquarters,133 a “run-down concrete building” that had not been 
remodeled since 1976.134  When they appealed to the Inspector General 
to investigate plans for this “Taj Mahal,”135 it found that  
“construction costs appear reasonable”136 and appropriate cost controls 
were in place.137  The National Capital Planning Commission even 
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“commend[ed]” the CFPB and the General Services Administration for 
the renovations.138 
At times oversight seemed designed to prevent the agency from ac-
complishing its statutorily directed obligations.  Dodd-Frank required 
the CFPB to study mandatory arbitration clauses and issue rules con-
sistent with its findings.139  Five days before the final rule went public, 
Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling threatened Cordray with con-
tempt proceedings if he promulgated the rule prior to the agency  
responding to his requests for thousands of documents.140  House  
Republicans had flooded the agency with oversight requests, writing 
ninety letters of inquiry to the agency between 2014 and 2017 and re-
quiring the agency to produce 170,000 pages of documents (which it 
did).141  Chairman Hensarling even adopted the practice of issuing  
unilateral subpoenas — without committee debate or vote — and pro-
ceeded to subpoena the CFPB twenty times, leading to more than forty 
hours of staff depositions.142 
When President Trump entered office in 2017, Republicans ex-
panded their arsenal against the agency.  They took up an innovative 
use for the Congressional Review Act143 (CRA).  The CRA is meant to 
allow Congress to override an agency rulemaking by a majority vote 
and the President’s signature.144  The Republicans used it to overturn 
the CFPB’s arbitration rule (with Vice President Pence’s tiebreaking 
vote),145 and then they went further and used it to overturn CFPB guid-
ance on auto lending.146  By the end of 2017, Republicans were even 
attacking the agency for inaction.  After the CFPB issued a historic fine 
against Wells Fargo for fraudulently opening accounts for unknowing 
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customers,147 Republicans criticized Cordray for not being aggressive 
enough.148 
C.  The Fox in the Henhouse 
“It’s time to fire King Richard,” Senator Ben Sasse commented prior 
to Donald Trump’s inauguration.149  Almost a year later, in November 
2017, Cordray resigned as head of the CFPB and designated his chief of 
staff Leondra English as the CFPB’s interim director.150  President 
Trump, a few hours later, appointed OMB director Mick Mulvaney as 
interim director.151  The schism at the CFPB immediately went to the 
courts, with English arguing that Dodd-Frank explicitly gave Cordray 
the power to choose an interim director and the Trump Administration 
countering that the terms of the Federal Vacancies Act governed.152  
English ended her challenge half a year later when President Trump 
nominated Kathy Kraninger to run the Bureau.153 
In control of the CFPB, Mulvaney and then Kraninger took to  
dismantling the financial watchdog from the inside.  Mulvaney had  
opposed the agency vehemently as a congressman and even sponsored 
legislation to eliminate it.154  Now at the helm of the agency he detested, 
Mulvaney went systematically through the agency’s structures, powers, 
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and operations to twist them to serve his preferences.  In area after  
area — enforcement, rulemaking, supervisions, funding, personnel, and 
culture — Mulvaney went to war. 
He halted new enforcement actions and started withdrawing ongoing 
enforcement actions, particularly against payday lenders.155  In 2018, the 
CFPB undertook only eleven enforcement actions, a fraction of the fifty-
five it announced in 2015.156  When it came to rulemaking, Mulvaney 
began by reconsidering payday lending rules157 and dropping plans for 
rules on overdraft payments and student loan servicing.158  Mulvaney’s 
CFPB decided it would no longer exercise its supervisory powers to  
prevent financial institutions from targeting servicemembers with 
fraudulent or abusive products.159  He downgraded the status of the stu-
dent lending office and the office of fair lending by merging them into 
other offices.160  And he told the Federal Reserve that the CFPB did not 
need any new funding.161 
The CFPB opponent-turned-leader ordered a hiring freeze upon  
taking over the agency, and effectively made it permanent as part of a 
strategy of attrition to reduce the capacity of the agency to regulate and 
enforce the laws.162  He tapped political appointees to be “policy associ-
ate directors” who would shadow the career civil service bureau chiefs, 
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implicitly to ensure they would comply with the Administration’s  
political preferences.163  New appointees often came from the ranks of 
those who had opposed the agency and worked to weaken it.164  And 
they summarily dismissed every member of the agency’s Consumer  
Advisory Board, Community Bank Advisory Council, and Credit Union 
Advisory Council.165 
Finally, Mulvaney took on a number of symbolic actions to break 
the consumer-focused, mission-driven culture of the agency.  His staff 
rewrote the CFPB’s mission statement to include a focus on “unduly 
burdensome regulations.”166  They changed the CFPB’s logo, sign, and 
name to the “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.”167  This cos-
metic and symbolic change would cost the agency between $9 and $19 
million and financial firms about $300 million.168  Mulvaney even 
changed the namesake of the agency’s honors program for graduating 
law students from noted consumer lawyer and Supreme Court Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis to Justice Joseph Story.  Justice Story, who is best 
known for his commentaries on the Constitution, has no obvious link to 
consumer issues.169 
According to one commentator, Mulvaney left the CFPB in a “vege-
tative state.”170  Director Kraninger’s tenure in office continued the 
trend.  Kraninger refused to get refunds for consumers when a payday 
lender extracted money from 6,829 consumer bank accounts without 
their permission — even though the lender offered to pay $1.6 million 
in restitution.171  And in the midst of the COVID-19 economic crisis, 
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with millions unemployed and tens of thousands of consumer com-
plaints flooding into the CFPB’s offices, Kraninger has instead sought 
to weaken or delay rules relating to mortgage lenders and credit card 
companies.172 
D.  Challenging the CFPB 
In light of the battle over the agency, it might not seem surprising 
that such a heated political brawl would take on a constitutional valence 
and that a constitutional challenge would reach the Supreme Court.  But 
it should be at least somewhat puzzling, given what the outcome was 
likely to be. 
The reason is that in 2010, the Supreme Court decided a case called 
Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board.  Free 
Enterprise Fund argued that the accounting agency’s for-cause removal 
restrictions rendered it unconstitutional because it was located within 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, another independent 
agency.173  This nestled system created a double-insulation from presi-
dential removal.  Free Enterprise Fund raised a variety of unitary exec-
utive theory arguments that would also surface in the CFPB case, but 
what is notable is that the Court stopped short of invalidating the 
PCAOB wholesale.174  Rather, it found that the removal provision was 
severable from the rest of the statute.175  The PCAOB continued to op-
erate, but board members would be subject to at-will removal from  
office.176 
Four years later, the CFPB issued charges against mortgage lender 
PHH for violating the Real Estate Settlements Procedures Act of 1974 
(RESPA) by soliciting reinsurance kickbacks from mortgage insurers in 
exchange for steering business to them.177  PHH responded by challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the agency’s structure, a case it ultimately 
lost en banc in the D.C. Circuit in 2018,178 after Cordray had left the 
agency and President Trump picked Mulvaney as interim successor. 
Given Free Enterprise Fund, it is not entirely clear why it made 
sense for PHH to challenge the constitutionality of the CFPB starting 
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in 2014.  Free Enterprise Fund provided strong evidence that the  
Roberts Court’s remedy for a constitutional violation of this type would 
be to sever the removal provision and let the agency continue to func-
tion.  PHH would therefore not have been off the hook had it won its 
challenge.  It is possible PHH thought a victory would enable the next 
Republican President, perhaps arriving in 2017, to fire Cordray and pick 
a new director who would grant them relief.  But through much of the 
2016 election cycle, the conventional wisdom was that Hillary Clinton 
would become President, not Donald Trump. 
Seila’s actions are equally puzzling, if not more so.  After losing its 
case in district court, Seila appealed to the Ninth Circuit in 2017179 and 
continued its case after Cordray had departed later that year and  
Mulvaney was interim director.  In spite of systematically attempting to 
dismantle the agency, the now Trump-controlled CFPB continued to 
press its case against Seila.  Perhaps this was to keep Seila’s constitu-
tional case alive.  But again, it is unclear why that mattered much, given 
the likely remedy after Free Enterprise Fund. 
So how do we explain the case?  I think there are two likely answers.  
First, as we have seen, for the entirety of the last decade, the CFPB has 
been the subject of relentless attacks — to prevent it from coming into 
being, weaken it, reform it, abolish it, and eviscerate it from the inside.  
This political and economic battle — a battle between Republicans and 
Democrats, between financial institutions and ordinary families, be-
tween Wall Street and Washington — simply gained a momentum that 
couldn’t be stopped.  The interests opposed to the agency had mobilized 
forces so widely that many others embraced the project to kill it.  Even 
if there were only a small chance of a broader, more radical victory — 
there was still a chance.  The second possibility, which is not in conflict 
with the first, is that the underlying aims of the case were to advance 
the constitutional vision of the unitary executive.  There too, there was 
a chance that a Supreme Court with new Justices might go further than 
the Free Enterprise Court. 
II.  SEILA AND THE RISE OF THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
Under the unitary executive theory, Article II, section 1 of the  
Constitution, which vests “the executive Power” in the President, com-
bines with the Take Care Clause to “creat[e] a hierarchical, unified ex-
ecutive department under the direct control of the President.”180  Unitary 
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executive theorists argue that the President holds “all” of the executive 
power.181  This includes, on their account, the power to “direct, control, 
and supervise inferior officers or agencies.”182  Among the consequences 
is that congressionally specified removal criteria are unconstitutional.183 
The Seila Court adopts much of the unitary executive theory’s rea-
soning.  This Part places Seila in a second context: the decades-long rise 
of the unitary executive theory.  It first recounts how the theory grew 
within the Justice Department in the 1980s, then in the academy in the 
1990s.  By the 2000s, the theory was prominent and, during the George 
W. Bush Administration, commonly invoked.  Seila should be seen as 
part of this broader legal movement, and the success of the movement 
in providing support for the theory can partly explain the brevity of the 
Court’s opinion.  In her skillful dissent, Justice Kagan takes aim at each 
of the pillars of the majority’s approach with devastating effect.  Her 
counterattack leaves the reader feeling that the 5–4 divide is not a mere 
difference of interpretation, but rather a serious political confrontation. 
A.  The Conservative Legal Movement and the  
Rise of the Unitary Executive Theory 
Debates over the President’s ability to remove executive branch of-
ficers have existed throughout American constitutional history and have 
regularly been some of the most fiercely battled political and legal is-
sues.184  But the modern debate over the removal power started during 
the Reagan Administration with the rise of the unitary executive the-
ory.185  Based on interviews, documents, and data collection, Professor 
Amanda Hollis-Brusky has shown how individuals and groups associ-
ated with the conservative legal movement worked from the 1980s 
through the 2000s to expand the plausibility and legitimacy of the  
unitary executive theory.186  The story of the theory’s rise is not the tra-
ditional one offered under the rubric of popular constitutionalism, which 
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emphasizes the importance of popular opinion.187  Rather, it was largely 
a function of shifting opinions among legal elites.  As Professor Jack 
Balkin has noted, arguments can go from “off the wall” to “on the wall” 
quickly when embraced by establishment politicians, and that in  
turn requires an intellectual foundation and often social movement  
support.188 
In the 1970s, the unitary theory per se hardly existed, with only a 
few scattered references in the legal literature.189  After the election of 
President Reagan and particularly after the selection of Ed Meese as 
Attorney General, the theory began to grow in prominence.  For  
conservatives in the Administration, as Professor and former Reagan 
Solicitor General Charles Fried has recounted, the Reagan Revolution 
had two parts.  The first was an economic revolution to prevent politi-
cians from “regulat[ing] the economy” and “redistribut[ing] wealth.”190  
The second was a legal revolution: “[C]ourts should be more disciplined, 
less adventurous and political in interpreting the law, especially the law 
of the Constitution; [and] the President must be allowed a strong hand 
in governing the nation and providing leadership . . . .”191 
Under Attorney General Meese, the Justice Department welcomed 
and encouraged intellectual discussion about the law, particularly in 
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leading to District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  That case is a good example of 
conservative popular constitutionalism that involved shifts in opinions among legal elites and a 
social movement.  See Reva B. Siegel, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term — Comment: Dead or Alive: 
Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192–93 (2008). 
 188 Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went  
Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/ 
258040 [https://perma.cc/NV88-VXS7]. 
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ways that advanced the conservative movement’s aims to expand pres-
idential power.  The Attorney General hosted seminars and workshops, 
including on the separation of powers and the unitary executive theory, 
in order to persuade skeptics — including Fried, who himself wasn’t 
initially “committed to th[e] program.”192  The push for greater presiden-
tial power largely focused on four areas: Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) 
opinions, presidential signing statements, regulatory review of agencies, 
and Supreme Court arguments. 
Over the course of the 1980s, the Reagan Administration issued 
seven OLC opinions that mentioned the unitary theory.  Notably, the 
theory evolved over time.  In 1981, it was described “in general and 
rather amorphous terms as the constitutional basis for the President’s 
role in ensuring ‘uniform and unitary’ execution of the laws.”193  But, 
Hollis-Brusky notes, it had “evolved into the ‘principle of the unitary 
executive’” by 1983.194  Some of these opinions, written by then-head of 
the Office of Legal Counsel Theodore Olson, tried to rein in different 
forms of agency independence.195  
The “signing statement initiative,” a second effort, was intended not 
to expound the unitary executive as doctrine, but to express it in prac-
tice.  The President would issue signing statements in order to give agen-
cies guidance on the President’s view of legislation.196 
The Reagan Administration also moved to gain more control over 
regulatory agencies.  President Reagan required executive branch agen-
cies to adopt rules based on cost-benefit analysis if permitted by statute, 
and to submit rules to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
for review.197  Despite an OLC opinion that it could apply the executive 
order to independent agencies, the administration declined to do so for 
political reasons.198  Still, it saw independent commissioners as “the ex-
treme example, a kind of emblem, of one of the biggest obstacles to the 
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administration’s program,”199 and members of the Administration 
wanted a Supreme Court case declaring “that statutory limitations on 
their removal were unconstitutional.”200  As Attorney General Meese 
said in a 1985 speech, “federal agencies performing executive functions 
are themselves properly agents of the executive.  They are not ‘quasi’ 
this or ‘independent’ that.”201 
The marquee event for the removal power during the Reagan  
Administration was Morrison v. Olson,202 a 1988 case challenging the 
constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in 
Government Act.203  In his 2–1 opinion in the D.C. Circuit, Judge  
Silberman referred to the unitary executive theory by name ten times in 
holding that the provisions were unconstitutional.204  At the Supreme 
Court, the government relied on the Take Care Clause to argue that the 
removal restriction was impermissible.205  Solicitor General Fried later 
said that he had been persuaded by Meese’s Department of Justice sem-
inars.206  By an 8–1 margin, with only Justice Scalia dissenting, the  
Supreme Court rejected the President’s power to remove the independ-
ent counsel, upholding the statute and in the process actually broadening 
the scope of the existing rule under Humphrey’s Executor.207  Justice 
Scalia’s dissent had referenced the theory twice by name,208 but the case 
was a devastating defeat for the unitary theory’s attempt to establish a 
presidential removal power.  So thorough was the loss that after Morrison 
reversed him, Judge Silberman analogized his opinion to Pickett’s 
Charge at Gettysburg, the “high water mark” of the Confederacy.209 
But it wasn’t.  Justice Scalia’s dissent gave the unitary executive new 
life.  From 1973 to 1988, Hollis-Brusky reports, the theory was men-
tioned by name in thirty-eight law review articles.210  In the four years 
after Morrison, seventy-six articles mentioned it.211  Throughout the 
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 204 In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d, 487 U.S. 654; Hollis-Brusky, supra 
note 186, at 208.  For a discussion of the case, see Stack, supra note 195, at 424. 
 205 See Brief for Appellee, Morrison, 487 U.S. 654 (No. 87-1279), 1987 WL 880907, at *18–20; 
Stack, supra note 195, at 425. 
 206 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 207.  
 207 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see also Morrison, 487 U.S. at 669. 
 208 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 727, 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 
209. 
 209 Hollis-Brusky, supra note 186, at 208 n.63 (quoting Laurence Silberman, Panel I: Agency 
Autonomy and the Unitary Executive, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 495, 500 (1990)). 
 210 Id. at 209–10. 
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1990s and into the 2000s, Federalist Society scholars took up the project 
of articulating the theory in great detail.212  Articles put forward the 
textual and structural case for the theory,213 the historical case for the 
theory,214 and even the functional arguments in its favor.215  This impres-
sive, systematic body of scholarship not only expanded the Overton win-
dow of legal argument, it also sparked more and more scholarship dis-
cussing the theory itself.  From 2001 to 2008, there were 453 articles 
discussing the unitary executive.216 
Along with a stronger academic pedigree, the theory found a second 
life in government.217  The Reagan Administration had mentioned the 
unitary executive in twelve executive branch documents; the George W. 
Bush Administration mentioned it in ninety.218  During the Bush  
Administration, the unitary executive found its way into OLC opinions 
on legal issues related to the war on terror, and it undergirded greater 
oversight of federal agencies.219  By the time of Free Enterprise Fund in 
2010 and Seila in 2020, the unitary executive theory had become standard 
in separation of powers debates — particularly among conservatives. 
B.  Seila and the Emergence of a Presidential Removal Power 
Writing for a 5–4 majority on the constitutional question in Seila, 
Chief Justice Roberts adopted much of the unitary executive theory’s 
reasoning.220  “‘[T]he executive Power shall be vested in a President,’ 
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who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’” Chief  
Justice Roberts began.221  He noted that the “entire” executive power 
belonged to the President,222 having elsewhere mentioned that “all of it” 
is the President’s.223  This power “generally includes the ability to re-
move executive officials, for it is ‘only the authority that can remove’ 
such officials that they ‘must fear and, in the performance of [their] 
functions, obey.’”224 
The Chief Justice briefly noted that this view was confirmed by his-
tory and precedent, and in two paragraphs summarized the so-called 
“Decision of 1789,” in which the first Congress debated removals while 
creating the first federal government departments, and Myers v. United 
States,225 in which Chief Justice Taft recognized “the President’s pre-
rogative to remove executive officials.”226  After referencing his own 
opinion in Free Enterprise Fund, Chief Justice Roberts announced two 
exceptions to the “President’s unrestricted removal power.”227  The first 
was based on Humphrey’s Executor.  That case was decided nine years 
after Myers and all but overturned it while upholding a law enabling 
Federal Trade Commissioners to serve for a term of years, with removal 
for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office.228  Roberts character-
ized Humphrey’s Executor narrowly, stating that the 1935 Court saw the 
FTC as not exercising substantial executive power.229  The second ex-
ception, which explained Morrison, was for “inferior officers with lim-
ited duties and no policymaking” role.230 
Applying this framework to the CFPB, the Chief Justice argued that 
the agency fit into neither exception.231  It exercised legislative, judicial, 
and executive functions, and, unlike the FTC, was not a multimember 
commission.  The CFPB director was also plainly not an inferior officer.  
The agency’s structure was “wholly unprecedented,” an “indication of 
[a] severe constitutional problem.”232  Chief Justice Roberts argued that 
four other examples of single-director agencies with removal protections 
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were short in duration or “modern and contested.”233  The agency’s de-
sign also violated the constitutional structure because the Constitution 
“avoids concentrating power in the hands of any single individual” ex-
cept the President.234  The Chief Justice noted that the Framers’ “con-
stitutional strategy [was] straightforward: divide power everywhere ex-
cept for the Presidency, and render the President directly accountable to 
the people through regular elections.”235  The CFPB’s structure was thus 
unconstitutional because it “vest[ed] significant governmental power in 
the hands of a single individual accountable to no one.”236  Turning to 
the remedy, Chief Justice Roberts found that the removal restriction was 
severable from the rest of the statute, citing Free Enterprise Fund.237 
Justice Thomas dissented from the severability analysis, arguing that 
the remedy should simply be to not enforce the CFPB’s actions.238  He 
also argued that Humphrey’s Executor was unconstitutional and should 
be overturned outright, instead of narrowed.239  Still, he was willing to 
join the Chief Justice because the opinion “limit[ed] Humphrey’s  
Executor to ‘multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial 
executive power.’”240  Justice Thomas then offered a full-throated artic-
ulation of the unitary executive theory that included complete executive 
power over removals.241 
Between the two opinions, five Justices have embraced much or all 
of the logic and reasoning of the unitary executive theory with respect 
to removals.  The President’s “executive power” and the Take Care 
Clause are the foundation for this largely preclusive removal power, and 
these Justices read history and precedents to support that position.   
Declared all but dead by Judge Silberman after the 8–1 defeat in  
Morrison, the unitary theory and the removal power rose again — and 
they now have a 5–4 majority on the Supreme Court. 
C.  The Case Against Seila 
What is perhaps most surprising about Seila’s treatment of text and 
structure is not that the Court came to interpretive judgments in these 
areas, but that it did so with comparatively little analysis or discussion, 
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given the rebuttals both in Justice Kagan’s spirited dissent and in a 
growing body of scholarship undermining those judgments.  Many of 
these arguments are well known and covered in Justice Kagan’s dissent, 
but a few are worth reiterating. 
First, the claim that “executive power” includes “the ability to re-
move executive officials.”242  Putting aside the atextual (and aggrandiz-
ing) references to “all of” or the “entire” executive power, one of the cen-
tral debates in removal cases is whether the power to remove a 
subordinate is “executive” in nature.  The text of the Constitution does 
not define “executive,” and Justice Kagan notes that the Morrison Court 
was unwilling to find a preclusive, unrestrictable removal power be-
cause of the term’s generality.243  The text itself gives a strong clue that 
“executive” cannot hold such a meaning.  Under the Opinions Clause in 
Article II, the President is explicitly authorized to ask subordinates for 
their written opinions.244  If the executive power were as vast and all-
inclusive as unitary theorists suggest, Justice Kagan observes, the  
Opinions Clause would be redundant at best and inexplicable at 
worst.245  The majority provides no response to this argument.  Justice 
Kagan also offers historical arguments to show that “executive power” 
does not include the power to remove: Parliament restricted the King’s 
removals, and many states at the time of the Framing permitted  
restrictions on gubernatorial removals.246  In recent scholarly work,  
Professor Julian Mortenson has gone further and demonstrated persua-
sively that in both England and during the Framing and Ratification 
period, the phrase “executive power” had no substantive content; it 
meant merely the power to execute laws created by some other body.247 
The Take Care Clause also provides the Court with little additional 
support for its position, as Justice Kagan notes and scholars have argued 
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at great length.248  The Clause is framed as a duty, rather than a power, 
and it appears in a section of Article II enumerating duties, not pow-
ers.249  To the extent the Take Care Clause is a power, Justice Kagan 
observes, it is only the power to ensure that “the laws” (however they 
are fashioned) are “executed.”250  In this sense, a removal according to 
congressionally specified criteria, such as inefficiency, neglect, or mal-
feasance in office, is the faithful execution of the laws.251  Nonremoval 
except for at the end of a term of years (which every appointee remov-
able for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office had252) is also the 
faithful execution of the laws.253  “The President,” as Justice Brandeis 
noted in Myers, “performs his full constitutional duty, if, with the means 
and instruments provided by Congress and within the limitations pre-
scribed by it, he uses his best endeavors to secure the faithful execution 
of the laws enacted.”254 
Perhaps the most striking feature of Seila’s textual and structural 
analysis is that, in his thirty-seven-page majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Roberts never once mentions the Necessary and Proper Clause.  The 
Clause is of obvious relevance, as it gives Congress the power “[t]o make 
all Laws . . . necessary and proper” to execute not just its Article I  
powers, but also “all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer 
thereof.”255  The Clause even uses the word “vest,” as if to make clear 
that Congress can pass laws to organize the executive power that is 
“vested” in Article II.256  As Dean John Manning has noted, “the  
Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress express power to prescribe 
the means by which both the executive and judicial powers are carried 
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into execution.”257  Justice Kagan deftly argues that the Court “appro-
priate[s]” this power from Congress.258  Another way to put it is that 
Seila involves the erasure of explicit, textually granted Article I powers. 
Seila also presumes that the President’s removal power is “confirmed 
by history and precedent.”259  The Chief Justice says that the so-called 
“Decision of 1789” settled the question.260  The best historical evidence, 
however, does not support this interpretation.  Justice Kagan notes that 
“Taft’s historical research [on the Decision] has held up even worse than 
Myers’ holding,” and observes that one of the leading scholars of execu-
tive power, Professor Sai Prakash, says in his study of the Decision that 
the First Congress “never squarely addressed” the removal question at 
issue in Seila.261  Professor Jed Shugerman’s review goes even further in 
questioning the Court’s reading of the early history.262  Shugerman ar-
gues that “Chief Justice Roberts’s interpretation is consistent with Taft’s 
Madison, but not Madison’s Madison.”263  Among other pieces of evi-
dence, including an extensive analysis of legislative voting patterns, 
Shugerman says Chief Justice Roberts ignores that Madison himself rec-
ognized the First Congress had not established a default rule in favor of 
at-pleasure removal.264 
In a set of passages reminiscent of Professor Karl Llewellyn’s famous 
account of the canons of construction, Justice Kagan and Chief Justice 
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Roberts also duel over the Federalist Papers.265  Llewellyn noted that 
for every canon there is an equal and opposite canon, such that any 
thrust of the rhetorical epee can be parried by a skilled fencer.266  Justice 
Kagan offers up dueling views on the removal power — both from the 
Federalist Papers — as a way to show that there was no settled meaning 
at ratification.267  The Chief Justice’s response is that Madison and 
Hamilton changed their minds over time.268  It may be that the Court 
means to adopt a “liquidation” theory of interpretation,269 but even then, 
the facts on the Decision of 1789 remain, at best, messy, complex, and 
inconclusive.  Whether or not the Court adopts a liquidation theory, its 
account of the historical record raises classic interpretive problems that 
Judge Harold Leventhal once described (and that Justice Scalia charac-
terized) as “looking over a crowd and picking your friends.”270  When a 
legislative record is conflicting, messy, and complicated, and the enacted 
legislative text is unclear, relying on reasoning and inferences from leg-
islative debates, proposals, actions, or inaction can easily turn into 
cherry-picking evidence that supports a predetermined policy position. 
Justice Kagan forcefully shows that precedent also cuts against the 
Court’s position.  Although the Chief Justice characterized Myers as a 
“landmark” case in both Free Enterprise Fund and Seila,271 Justice  
Kagan points out that the Court had all but overturned Myers prior to 
these recent cases, in favor of the approach offered in Humphrey’s  
Executor and Morrison.  Humphrey’s Executor, Justice Kagan notes, 
“unceremoniously — and unanimously — confined Myers to its facts” 
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and “expressly ‘disapproved’” everything in the decision as “out of har-
mony” with Humphrey’s Executor (with the sole exception of the narrow 
factual holding regarding postmasters of the first class).272 
Justice Kagan also pushed back on the Court’s antinovelty claim.  
The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a “Rinse and Repeat” clause, 
she said.273  “Congress had no obligation to make a carbon copy of a 
design from a bygone era.”274  In scholarly work, Professor Leah Litman 
has exhaustively shown that antinovelty arguments make little logical 
or constitutional sense, in part because there is no constitutional or prac-
tical reason for Congress to regulate to its fullest capacity in every pos-
sible manner at every possible time.275  But it is also worth noting that 
how the Court frames the historical scope of its inquiry shapes whether 
an agency’s design looks novel.  For example, Seila talks of the Civil 
War–era Comptroller, but not the Founding-era Comptroller (as Justice 
Kagan points out).276  It discusses the Administrator of Social Security 
and the head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency,277 but not  
the Sinking Fund Commission, a Hamilton-proposed, First  
Congress–created economic agency whose members included the Chief 
Justice and the Vice President, neither of whom could be removed from 
office.278  The Court also offers no explanation for the Second National 
Bank, created in 1816 with the assent of then-President James  
Madison.279  The President could appoint and remove only one-fifth of 
the Bank’s directors.280  The Second Bank, of course, was also upheld 
by Chief Justice Marshall as an exercise of the Necessary and Proper 
power in McCulloch v. Maryland.281  Framing the scope of historical 
practice — and limiting it to single-director heads of agencies with for-
cause removal protections — is itself a freighted choice.  It is unclear 
why the Court should adopt this level of specificity when evaluating the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 272 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2233 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting 
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935)).  
 273 Id. at 2241.  
 274 Id. at 2242.  
 275 Leah M. Litman, Debunking Antinovelty, 66 DUKE L.J. 1407, 1427–28 (2017).  For a discus-
sion of innovation-based arguments in the context of recess appointments, see Gillian E. Metzger, 
Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607 (2015). 
 276 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2241 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 277 Id. at 2202 (majority opinion). 
 278 See id. at 2229, 2230–31 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Christine Kexel 
Chabot, Is the Federal Reserve Constitutional? An Originalist Argument for Independent Agencies, 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3458182 [https://perma.cc/6UVW-3MY8]. 
 279 Seila, 140 S. Ct. at 2231 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 280 Id. 
 281 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
  
388 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 134:352 
congressional design of agencies, unless its goal is to stack the deck 
against novel agency designs.282 
All of this should be troubling to most constitutional lawyers.  One 
of the central arguments for relying on text and history in constitutional 
interpretation is judicial restraint.283  Following the text or the original 
history, or even historical practice, is supposed to constrain judges and 
prevent them from imposing their policy preferences on the country.284  
The more a judge is picking friends from the historical crowd, to modify 
the old saying, the more likely it is the judge is making policy.  Given 
the strong arguments against the Court’s position on text, structure, 
original history, and historical practice, let alone the un-precedenting of 
Humphrey’s Executor and re-precedenting of Myers, it is not clear that 
there is much restraint being exercised in Seila. 
And it is not as if a restrained approach was unavailable to the con-
servative majority.  In thorough, expansive, and persuasive articles, 
Dean John Manning has offered a lesson in how a faithful, conservative, 
restrained interpreter of the Constitution’s text should address separa-
tion of powers cases.285  “Where the Constitution is specific,” the Court 
should follow it.286  Where “no specific clause speaks directly to the 
question at issue, interpreters must respect the document’s indetermi-
nacy,”287 which in this context defaults to the textually granted general 
authority of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  But the Court does not 
follow Manning’s approach or counter it.  Indeed, it is Justice Kagan 
who cites Manning and makes the case for judicial restraint in light of 
text and history.288 
As if to underscore, albeit subtly, that even the Justices understood 
that Seila was a deeply political case, the amicus appointed to argue the 
CFPB’s case was distinguished conservative lawyer Paul Clement.289  
Commentators noted that Justice Kagan likely chose Clement in order 
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to appeal to the Court’s conservatives and depoliticize the case.290  After 
oral argument, however, some commentators suggested this tactic might 
have backfired, because of both Clement’s style and his substance.291 
Ultimately, the Court’s weak reasoning, Justice Kagan’s efficient 
work dismantling it, and the availability of a conservative, textualist 
alternative leave a reader wondering if there is something else at issue 
in Seila than a simple divide on a technical question of constitutional 
interpretation — and something bigger at stake with the rise of the uni-
tary executive theory and its support for a preclusive presidential re-
moval power. 
III.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REMOVALS 
One of the more striking things about Seila is that its first-order po-
litical consequences hardly seem to warrant the conflict over it.  It is 
certainly possible that liberals and conservatives simply disagree on the 
best reading of the legal materials.  But it is worth considering whether 
the issue in Seila might have broader political underpinnings and con-
sequences.  This Part starts by noting the first-order symmetry in Seila 
and the broader unitary theory as applied to the removal power.  It then 
speculates on some ways in which Seila might have a normative, and 
ideologically contested, vision of the Constitution undergirding it, and 
on the particular ways in which its consequences might have politically 
relevant implications for the administrative state.  This third story offers 
more reasons why Seila is worthy of attention and should be considered 
a deeply “political” case. 
A.  First-Order Symmetry and the Unitary Executive 
The result in Seila, as I have noted, does not have obvious first- 
order political benefits for conservatives or Republicans.  The Trump 
Administration already controls the CFPB, so the case does not benefit 
the current Administration.  If anything, it could harm the current  
Administration.  The rule in Seila means a new Democratic President 
could fire the Republican head of the CFPB and nominate a person of 
their choosing.  Indeed, after the case was decided, commentators  
immediately noted that the decision was a “real gift” to a possible Biden 
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Administration, as he could fire Director Kraninger on day one if he is 
elected.292 
An even more aggressive unitary executive decision, along the lines 
Justice Thomas suggests, would not have made Seila more favorable to 
conservatives, in terms of its first-order effects.  Seila itself seems to 
contemplate future cases marching in this direction.  Chief Justice  
Roberts described the exceptions to a preclusive presidential removal 
power as twofold: “[O]ne for multimember expert agencies that do not 
wield substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with lim-
ited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.”293  Any 
multimember commission that currently “wields substantial executive 
power” is thus potentially at risk of constitutional challenge to ensure its 
members are removable at-will by the President.294 
Every member of the Court seems to understand this phrase as in-
viting further litigation.  The majority attempted to reframe the FTC’s 
powers in 1935 as limited to “making reports and recommendations to 
Congress” and “submitting recommended dispositions to an Article III 
court.”295  This characterization creates a contrast between the 1935 
FTC (which was upheld because it did not wield substantial executive 
power) and the current FTC (which by implication does wield substan-
tial executive power).  Justice Kagan fired back that the FTC “could 
and did run investigations, bring administrative charges, and conduct 
adjudications,” and that it “lacks all plausibility” that the Court in 1935 
misunderstood these powers.296  Her point is to show that the FTC in 
1935 did wield substantial executive powers, so as to insulate it (and 
other agencies) from a future challenge.  Meanwhile, Justice Thomas 
noted that he joined the majority opinion because the Court limited 
Humphrey’s Executor to agencies that do not wield substantial executive 
power.297  He even emphasized that clause in italics, perhaps as a flag to 
future litigants.298  It’s hard to read these passages as anything less than 
the first shots in the battle to extend the removal power to multimember 
commissions. 
But here’s the thing: if the Court does expand the President’s pre-
clusive removal power to cover multimember commissions for which 
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Congress has specified removal criteria, that enterprise is also likely to 
have symmetrical first-order political effects.  With an expansive re-
moval power, a Democratic President could fire inherited Republican 
multimember commissioners and nominate new Republican commis-
sioners — but ones who are more aligned with the President’s views.  
Alternatively, a Democratic President could fire Republican commis-
sioners and leave their positions open, so long as quorum requirements 
are met to keep the agency functioning.  In either case, a Democratic 
President could then direct the expansive powers of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Federal 
Communications Commission, among other agencies.  A Republican 
President could, of course, do the same.  But that is the point.  The first-
order consequences do not obviously help Republicans or Democrats, 
conservatives or progressives.  Whether we frame the President as a 
“decider” or “overseer” with respect to federal agencies does not have 
obvious first-order implications.299 
That conservative presidential administrations and their movement 
allies have thus embraced the unitary theory is perhaps somewhat sur-
prising, and maybe more so given the history of the presidency.  In the 
late nineteenth century, the presidency was not at the center of the 
American political or constitutional universe.  Woodrow Wilson’s classic 
1885 book was entitled Congressional Government, not presidential gov-
ernment,300 and Lord Bryce felt obligated to include an entire chapter in 
his The American Commonwealth explaining why “great men” are not 
elected President.301 
The transformation of the presidency happened with the Progressive 
Era.  Constitutional scholars tend to recall President Theodore  
Roosevelt’s comments that the President was empowered to do virtually 
anything not prohibited by the Constitution.302  His approach may have 
been on the far end of the constitutional spectrum, but Progressive Era 
intellectuals generally pushed to expand the power of the presidency as 
part of an attempt to shift policymaking away from the constraints of 
courts and Congress.303  They believed that a less constrained President 
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would be more attuned to the needs of democracy.  Wilson thus claimed 
the President was the “only national voice” in public affairs, and pro-
gressives saw Presidents as at once leading public opinion and being 
regulated by it.304  This reimagining of the presidency was coupled with 
a decades-long refashioning of administrative power from the cronyist, 
patronage-focused spoils system of the nineteenth century to a more  
expert-oriented enterprise that was decoupled from party machines and 
bosses.  At the same time, progressives were clear that their aim was not 
a resurrection of the royal prerogative.305  “The modern president,”  
Professor Stephen Skowronek writes, “would not direct affairs at will; 
he would orchestrate the work of the whole according to commonly rec-
ognized and externally verifiable standards.”306 
Presidential power and administrative capacity thus went hand in 
hand, and the two were largely designed to advance the goals of eco-
nomic regulation.  Rooseveltians wanted the federal government to reg-
ulate corporations.307  Brandeisians wanted the federal government to 
break them up.308  Still others wanted federal-corporate collaboration to 
stop “ruinous competition.”309  But in each case, the aim was federal power 
to regulate economic activity — and this required both administrative ca-
pacity and presidential leadership.  A generation later, President Franklin 
Roosevelt pursued each of these courses at various times, using the 
“bully pulpit” that his distant relative had christened to mobilize support 
for a range of regulatory policies.310  More narrowly, it is worth pointing 
out that it was Democrat Woodrow Wilson who fired Myers, and Dem-
ocrat Franklin Roosevelt who fired Humphrey.  Progressives and their 
Presidents championed presidential and administrative power largely in 
order to bring the economically powerful to heel.  If history is any guide, 
we might even wonder if the unitary executive theory might one day 
find favor with future progressive Presidents.  But to even point out that 
possibility is to recognize first-order political symmetry. 
B.  Why the Removal Power Is “Political” 
Given the prominence of the case and the ferocity of the battles over 
it, it seems unlikely that there is nothing deeper, nothing political, at 
stake.  So what are the possible “political” reasons why conservatives 
are so supportive of a preclusive removal power?  Or, alternatively, what 
“political” features make progressives so fiercely opposed to it? 
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I think there are a number of possible explanations, and they can be 
divided into two categories.  First are normative views of how the sep-
aration of powers should function.  At times, the opinion in Seila reveals 
normative assumptions about constitutional dynamics and values that 
plausibly align with ideological divisions.  Second are the consequences 
for the administrative state.  Commentators often reference the rise of the 
removal power as tied to an assault on the administrative state, but it is 
not entirely clear what mechanism links the two (as compared, for exam-
ple, to the nondelegation doctrine, which has an obvious first-order  
relationship to the administrative state).  These two categories are not mu-
tually exclusive, but separating them out — and separating out some of the 
different possibilities within each — helps identify the political stakes.311 
1.  Normative Views of the Separation of Powers. — By normative 
view of the separation of powers, I do not mean the best reading of the 
relevant legal materials on any particular provision.  I mean that  
conservatives and liberals might have different views of what the  
Constitution should require, based on functional preferences or norma-
tive intuitions.  In any given case, legal doctrines and interpretive meth-
ods might be deployed to achieve that constitutional vision.  In Seila 
and the removal cases, at least three normative views of the separation 
of powers are identifiable. 
First, and following one of Justice Kagan’s comments, is a kind of 
Schoolhouse Rock constitutionalism.  In her dissent, Justice Kagan nee-
dled the majority for adopting an overly simplistic approach to consti-
tutional structure, akin to the cartoon civics video’s explanation of the 
federal government.312  Her comments seem only partly in jest.  It is 
possible that some people could have a normative commitment to such 
an approach.  One could think the Constitution should adhere to a  
simple structure of three branches, totally separated, and that such an ap-
proach is net beneficial because it is simpler to administer or easier to ex-
plain to the general public.  The trouble, of course, is that the Schoolhouse 
Rock Constitution is manifestly not our Constitution.  Moving toward a 
simplified form is plainly a political choice, not a legal one.313 
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A second view that emerges from the removal cases might be called 
strongman constitutionalism or, for the age of Donald Trump, the fet-
ishization of firing.  One of the striking things about Myers, Free  
Enterprise Fund, and Seila is their view of management and leadership.  
Without the removal power, Chief Justice Roberts said, quoting Myers, 
it “would make it impossible for the President . . . to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed.”314  The reason is that officials in the execu-
tive branch will only “fear” and “obey” the “authority that can remove” 
them.315  “[T]he threat of removal” is what enables control.316  As a result, 
any other elements that might be considered relevant to the political 
control of the bureaucracy — funding, personal relationships, oversight, 
political factors — are simply “bureaucratic minutiae.”317 
This overarching worldview — which depends on “fear” and 
“threat[s]” to get people to “obey” — seems to involve a strongman leader 
who controls the bureaucracy from the top down.  Other commentators 
have called the removal power the “gun behind the door” because it 
enables the president to “bend” subordinates “to his will.”318  This ap-
proach is perhaps somewhat fitting for the moment, given that the current 
occupant of the White House’s most famous phrase is “You’re Fired.”319 
It is worth pointing out that there is nothing legal or constitutional 
about this approach — including the reasoning behind the removal 
power as a way to effectuate political control of the bureaucracy.   
Rather, this is a form of what Professors David Pozen and Adam  
Samaha have called “anti-modalities” in constitutional law.320  Pozen 
and Samaha show that functional arguments often seep into constitu-
tional law, under the cover of accepted modalities of constitutional rea-
soning or by modification into shallow and superficial platitudes so as 
not to appear as “impermissible” policy arguments.321 
Indeed, the idea that everything but firing is “bureaucratic minutiae” 
and that firing is the only effective means of control would be a surprise 
to the entire field of political science, and much of administrative law 
too.  Members of these fields have spent decades describing various 
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forms of political control over the bureaucracy short of firing.  Books 
and articles recount the many ways Congress exercises control over 
agencies;322 the ways Presidents exercise power over officials short  
of threatening to remove them;323 examples of situations in which a  
President cannot practically remove subordinates because of their inde-
pendent power or leverage;324 and indeed, even the ways in which pres-
idential removal might be unnecessary, ineffectual, or actually backfire 
and reduce political control of the bureaucracy.325 
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In other words, there are a range of views on how best to control 
bureaucracies, including debates over whether presidential control 
through removal is the optimal way to do so.  The vision of Presidents 
governing the bureaucracy through “fear” and “threat[s]” is one ap-
proach to management.  But it is not the only one.  And it is also hard 
to believe that the generation that overthrew a king would have en-
dorsed it.  For our purposes, however, the point is not that political con-
trol of the bureaucracy through fear and threats is the right or wrong 
approach.  It is that it is fundamentally a choice — and a contested one 
— to govern in that way.  The Court, as Justice Kagan says, “has nothing 
but intuition to back up its essentially functionalist claim that the CFPB 
would be less capable of exercising power if it had more than one  
Director.”326  It also has nothing but intuition to back up its essentially 
functionalist claim that at-will removal is necessary for political control 
of the bureaucracy. 
A brief sidebar: if members of the Court do take this view of mana-
gerial dynamics, it likely implies that they see themselves as completely 
unaccountable.  Unlike the President, they are not subject to elections, 
and any other mechanism of political control over the judiciary would 
be, in the Chief Justice’s words, “bureaucratic minutiae.”  To the extent 
the Justices do feel disciplined by other factors, such as public opinion, 
then their intuition about the essential role the threat of firing plays is 
inconsistent with their own behavior and experience. 
In any case, conservatives might support strongman constitutional-
ism for functional reasons.  They could think it is the most effective (or 
only effective) way to “take care” that the laws are faithfully executed.  
Another possibility is that the roots of strongman constitutionalism are 
psychological.  In his book The Righteous Mind, Professor Jonathan 
Haidt argues that conservatives differ from liberals at the level of deep 
psychological intuitions, particularly with respect to their commitment 
to hierarchy.327  Political scientists have similarly suggested that diver-
gences of this type can explain a great number of policy differences.328  
It is possible that either some psychological impetus, or more weakly, 
simply an intuition in favor of hierarchy, is at the source of conserva-
tives’ general preference for the removal power, the unitary executive, 
and the system of management that undergirds both.  Given that there 
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is nothing “legal” or “constitutional” about psychological biases, if Seila 
is based in part on these intuitions, it should be seen as political. 
A third view is of libertarian constitutionalism.  Conservatives might 
hold a normative position that the Constitution should put a thumb on 
the scale against federal power generally and economic regulation  
specifically.329  This libertarian vision often seeps into constitutional ar-
guments, with the libertarian anti-modality masquerading as constitu-
tional reasoning.  For example, the Supreme Court frequently argues 
that the separation of powers exists, in part, to safeguard individual  
liberty.330  Seila continues this trend, claiming that “[t]he Framers rec-
ognized that, in the long term, structural protections against abuse of 
power were critical to preserving liberty.”331  This libertarian separation 
of powers argument suggests that it is essential to prevent the accumu-
lation of power to preserve freedom from government tyranny, and is 
offered in defense of a formalist reading of the structural separation of 
powers principle.332  But the argument says nothing about the ability of 
government to protect individuals from private tyranny.333  As one 
scholar has noted, “it can be just as oppressive to prevent government 
from operating as to hijack its operation for factional ends.”334 
This concern, at least as much as the libertarian one, motivated the 
Framers to create the Constitution.  Constitutionalism, as scholars have 
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long observed, involves both creating capacity for government and con-
trolling government, both building power and constraining it.335  As 
Madison wrote in The Federalist No. 51, “[i]n framing a government 
. . . the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control  
itself.”336  Indeed, the entire purpose of the creation of the U.S.  
Constitution was to make the national government stronger than the 
government under the Articles of Confederation.337 
The CFPB offers an excellent illustration.  The agency was created 
after widespread private discrimination and fraud collapsed the national 
and global economies, with devastating consequences for individuals’ 
lives and livelihoods.  The actors who perpetrated those frauds then 
fought tooth and nail to prevent regulation of their behavior.  The 
CFPB, as Justice Kagan pointed out, has recovered more than $11 bil-
lion for consumers who were cheated by financial institutions.338   
What motivates Seila, however, seems to be the hypothetical possi-
bility of “kneebuckling penalties against private citizens” rather than the 
fact that some private citizens took a financial baseball bat to the knees 
of other private citizens.339  Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts’s description 
of the circumstances around the creation of the CFPB makes no mention 
of discrimination, fraud, tricks, traps, deception, or any other illegal, 
unfair, or problematic practices.  Rather, he characterized the 2008 crisis 
as coming (passively) when “the subprime mortgage market collapsed,” 
and Warren’s feeling that products were “unsafe” as simply about the 
“regulatory jumble.”340 
For our purposes, the point is not whether the danger of government 
issuing “kneebuckling penalties” is more or less than the danger of private 
actors engaging in discrimination and fraud.  It is that the “safeguards 
of liberty” principle smuggles into separation of powers debates an  
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assumption that the libertarian concern is stronger than the government-
capacity concern.  This is the Safeguards of Liberty Fallacy341: even if 
the principle captures something important at a high level of theoretical 
generality, it tells us nothing about how any given case should come out 
because it is contravened by the equal and opposite principle of needing 
to enable a strong government in order to prevent private tyranny.   
Placing a thumb on the scale for the libertarian approach is a contested 
political preference. 
2.  Consequences of Reducing Agency Independence. — Seila might 
also be seen as political because there are asymmetric political conse-
quences to creating a presidential removal power — even if they are not 
first-order political consequences.  Scholars and commentators fre-
quently say that the political stakes in removal cases include the exist-
ence and capacity of the administrative state.342  At this high level of 
generality, however, it is not clear how exactly that threat manifests.  
Progressive Presidents could, of course, use unitary removal powers to 
expand the regulatory state.  This makes removal different from the 
nondelegation doctrine, which has clear first-order consequences for the 
administrative state.343  In this section, I consider some of the specific 
mechanisms by which the removal power could be asymmetrically “po-
litical” with respect to the administrative state — in ways that might 
explain the ideological divide. 
We might call the first possibility asymmetric bureaucracy.  This pos-
sibility operates at the level of both agency leadership (commissioners 
and agency directors) and civil service bureaucrats.  Conservatives 
might think that the civil service is largely liberal ideologically and that 
agencies with leadership that is insulated from removal might be more 
likely to operate in the center-left of the political spectrum.  With this 
assumption, a presidential removal power could potentially have an 
asymmetric effect on the bureaucracy.  Firing liberal or moderately con-
servative agency leaders could make room for more conservative leaders 
who can then direct the civil service in line with conservative prefer-
ences.  And even if they encounter a “deep state” that will not implement 
conservative positions, conservative agency leaders would at least have 
the power to stop the civil service from taking liberal actions.344 
Whether or not distrust of “liberal” civil servants is warranted, a 
blanket fear of a liberal bureaucracy does not appear to be.  There is 
some evidence there are more liberal federal employees than conserva-
tive ones, but the differences might not be as great as those who worry 
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about deep state conspiracies think.345  In addition, political scientists 
Mark Richardson, Joshua Clinton, and David Lewis have shown that 
the bureaucracy is not monolithic in its ideology.  Some agencies are 
perceived to slant conservative, while others are perceived to be lib-
eral.346  And it is not clear that agencies with removal protections are 
systematically more liberal than agencies under the eye of the President.  
The Defense Department comes close to maxing out the Richardson-
Clinton-Lewis scale on the conservative side, while the Department of 
Health and Human Services is the mirror image on the liberal side.347  
Neither has congressionally specified removal criteria for its leadership.  
The SEC and CFTC, commissions with independence from presidential 
removal, are perceived to lean conservative; the CFPB and the  
Consumer Products Safety Commission, liberal.348  Within agencies, 
there is also variation, with some offices considered more conservative 
than others.349 
The choices between a single-director agency and a multimember 
commission and between removal protections or their absence are also 
often conflated.350  Separating the two does not help much, at least log-
ically, in identifying a systematic skew either.  An EPA that oscillates 
between conservatives and liberals does not seem so different than the 
Cordray-Mulvaney divide at the CFPB.  Indeed, some might contend 
that a CFPB that oscillates between conservatives and progressives will, 
on net, be more progressive than an SEC that is relatively conservative 
regardless of the partisan composition of the Commission.351  The need 
for multiple votes, asymmetric partisan polarization (among commis-
sioners), the Democratic coalition’s balance between progressives and 
centrists, and a host of other factors arguably combine to ensure that 
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multimember commissions will not be terribly progressive, even though 
commissioners are not removable at will.352 
It is also not clear that a civil servant in an agency whose leadership 
is removable will exert more independent power over policy than will 
their counterpart in an agency whose leadership is not removable.  It 
might instead be that civil servants in both cases take direction faithfully 
from the agency leadership — or that civil servants in both cases disobey 
guidance from agency leadership.353  Similarly, accounts of removable po-
litical appointees taking aggressive actions that even push civil servants to 
the point of resignation do not seem so far from Director Mulvaney’s  
aggressive actions as the nonremovable head of the CFPB.354  And of 
course, civil service disobedience can take place in both Republican and 
Democratic administrations.355  In any case, political scientists have 
found that civil servants report that their senior ranks are responsive or 
very responsive to the policy decisions of the President.356  In a  
Democratic administration, liberal agencies are more responsive than 
conservative agencies, and the opposite is likely true as well.357 
Still, regardless of accuracy or precision, it remains possible that the 
politics of the removal power are based on some general impression that 
the administrative state is liberal — and an assumption that presidential 
removal can rein in a liberal bureaucracy. 
A second possibility is asymmetric presidential administration.  It 
might be that conservatives think that Democrats and Republicans are 
asymmetrically polarized not just in their political views,358 their will-
ingness to fill judicial positions,359 or their willingness to play political 
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and constitutional hardball360 — but also their willingness to have the 
President wield the powers of the administrative state.  Democrats 
might be systematically unwilling to appoint officials who are progres-
sive and to use the administrative state aggressively for regulatory ends.  
Republicans might be systematically willing to appoint extreme con-
servatives and to use the administrative state aggressively for deregula-
tory ends.  In that case, the removal authority would mean a net benefit 
over time for conservatives. 
The history of the Reagan Justice Department’s actions suggests an 
understanding of the possibilities of using legal authorities and argu-
ments aggressively to change the terms of policy and politics.361  So long 
as conservatives were ahead of the curve in recognizing and using those 
tactics, the removal power and the broader unitary theory would have 
asymmetric effects.  Some might argue that progressives also use presi-
dential power aggressively, potentially making this explanation less val-
uable.362  But even with President Clinton’s use of presidential admin-
istration363 and President Obama’s often creative regulatory 
endeavors,364 it may be that presidential administration is asymmetri-
cally polarized.  The Trump Administration’s approach to the CFPB, 
for example, has been far more radically deregulatory than the CFPB 
was regulatory in its early years. 
More broadly, given the historical relationship between progressives 
and the presidency, the recent example of President Obama’s use of ex-
ecutive authorities, and the challenges of retaining unified government, 
one might think Democrats might even come to embrace the unitary 
theory as a way to accomplish their policy goals.  There are a variety of 
practical and political reasons why an asymmetry in views of the unitary 
theory is likely to persist — including Democrats’ tendency to a techno-
cratic form of governance, the heterogeneity of the Democratic political 
coalition, industry capture and the divide between left-neoliberals and 
progressives, and fears that playing hardball will backfire — but it is 
also worth noting a set of intellectual commitments within the left that 
make ideological drift along these lines unlikely. 
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Democrats might potentially be willing to support a unitary theory 
when it comes to the regulatory state but not the national security state.  
Civil libertarian fears with respect to war and criminal justice push 
against building state capacity, even though state capacity is also needed 
to combat economic power and address economic injustice.  General 
theories of state power thus run up against these policy preferences.   
Indeed, Democrats tend to be internally divided between liberals, who 
are more concerned with individual rights, and progressives, who are 
more concerned with building structures of power.365  This divide might 
make progressives more willing to build executive power than liberals, 
even with the attendant risks, but the fractured coalition may make 
adopting the theory more difficult. 
Interestingly, liberals and progressives could develop a structural 
constitutional or political theory that might account for these challenges.  
Constitutional theorists speak frequently of foreign affairs or national 
security exceptionalism, with those realms warranting greater executive 
power and judicial deference than domestic affairs.366  But one could 
imagine progressives developing a theory of national security exception-
alism that cuts in the opposite direction.  Given the particular dangers 
of state power over life itself and a range of hawkish biases that affect 
individual and group decisionmaking,367 controls on state power should 
arguably be more stringent in these sectors, not less, than in the eco-
nomic realm — or at least equally stringent.368  A theory along these 
lines would parallel the divide between economic regulation and per-
sonal rights that emerged through the New Deal settlement, but at the 
level of structure rather than rights.369 
A third, and closely related, possibility might be thought of as what 
Steve Bannon called the “deconstruction of the administrative state.”370  
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Progessive-era reformers saw the administrative state as “the only insti-
tution capable of securing a competitive economy and fair society,” and 
their opponents thus saw it as “an intrinsic threat to personal freedom 
and private ordering.”371  Conservatives might therefore want to under-
mine it.  There are two linked, asymmetric mechanisms at work.  The 
first is the asymmetry in building and breaking.  In his book Political 
Order and Political Decay, Professor Francis Fukuyama argues that in-
stitutions can suffer from political decay if they fail to reform and update 
to changed conditions.372  He notes that dysfunction and entrenched ac-
tors in the United States contribute to this decay.373  But active efforts 
to break institutional capacity do as well.  As he describes in great detail, 
building institutional capacity and reforming institutions is difficult 
work.374  If it is easier to break an institution than it is to build it, easier 
to erode capacity than to generate it, then greater presidential control 
might have asymmetric effects that benefit those who want to break 
institutional capacity more than those who want to strengthen it.   
Expansive presidential power is particularly important for this project 
if proponents cannot get the votes or political support to pass legislation 
eliminating agencies altogether. 
The “deconstruction of the administrative state” might not simply 
mean a desire to deregulate or reduce the capacity of the regulatory 
state.  It is possible that the aim is to delegitimize the administrative 
state altogether.375  Here, the removal power could have asymmetric ef-
fects through the mechanism of making the federal government more 
partisan and more responsive to presidential preferences.  While re-
moval is not the only and perhaps not even the most important element 
of agency independence, it is clear, concrete, and perhaps symbolically 
important.  Members of agencies who hold norms and follow practices 
of independence might see their own roles differently if the agency head 
is formally removable at will — precisely because that power is attached 
to the unitary theory.376  In addition, if the public increasingly sees “ex-
pert” agencies as little more than arms of partisans, subject to the whims 
of the President and staffed with the President’s cronies, then the entire 
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expertise-based administrative enterprise might increasingly appear il-
legitimate.  This could be based on an opposition to expertise in itself377 
or to governance by semiautonomous experts.378 
Delegitimizing the expert-based administrative state would have 
multiple consequences.  It would undermine the existing administrative 
state’s operations and also reduce the likelihood of future innovations 
and the development of administrative capacity to address new prob-
lems that emerge.379  Importantly, reducing the legitimacy of the admin-
istrative state could also have a spiraling effect, by which, as Fukuyama 
has explained, “[d]istrust of executive agencies leads [to] demands for 
more legal checks on administration, which further reduces the quality 
and effectiveness of government by reducing bureaucratic autonomy.”380  
The consequence would be a vicious cycle that keeps eroding bureau-
cratic institutions and public confidence in them. 
The fourth and final explanation rests on constitutional political 
economy.381  The policy fights over the CFPB — and the PCAOB — 
were fiercely contested because they were fundamentally about the reg-
ulation of economically powerful actors.  Most commentators in recent 
years have focused on the First Amendment as the constitutional 
weapon of choice in facilitating a deregulatory policy agenda.382  Another 
tactic is narrowing the scope of the Commerce Clause, an approach that 
has enjoyed an occasional revival in both the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts.383  The First Amendment operates as an external limit on con-
gressional power; the new Commerce Clause jurisprudence acts as an 
internal limit.384 
Seila and Free Enterprise Fund might be seen as another front in 
the war over constitutional political economy, with the site of the battle 
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being the Necessary and Proper Clause.385  The cases, and the unitary 
theory itself, are framed around giving content to unspecified Article II 
powers.  The constant reference to “all” executive power broadens the 
scope of that unspecified power, while individual cases help articulate 
its content.  But unitary theory conservatives never seem to reference 
“all” of Congress’s Necessary and Proper power.  As we have seen, the 
Seila majority does not mention the clause at all.  The unitary executive 
theory’s expansion of preclusive Article II powers may therefore be as 
much about shrinking Congress’s textually granted and extremely broad 
Article I Necessary and Proper power.  Seila could thus be read in con-
junction with the creation of the recognition power in Zivotofsky II;386 
with the Court’s recent opinions shrinking the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, like NFIB v. Sebelius;387 and with its broader First Amendment 
and Commerce Clause jurisprudence constraining Congress’s power to 
regulate.388 
If Seila, the removal power, and the modern rise of the unitary ex-
ecutive theory are indeed part of a broader battle to reduce the power of 
Congress, the political context of the mid-twentieth century was likely 
an important contributing factor.  From 1933 until 1995 — a total of 
sixty-two years — Democrats held the House of Representatives for 
fifty-eight years.389  During those same sixty-two years, Democrats held 
the Senate for fifty-two.390  But partisan control over the presidency was 
far more evenly divided — twenty-eight years for Republicans and 
thirty-four years for Democrats.  The result is that for decades a  
Democratic Congress passed legislation and created agencies with eco-
nomic and general welfare missions that differed from conservative 
preferences.  Conservatives might have noticed that increasing presiden-
tial powers and reducing congressional power would be to their benefit 
because they were more likely to take control of the presidency than 
Congress.  When the unitary executive theory and the modern drive for 
a removal power emerged in the 1980s, Republicans had held power in 
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Congress for only four years in almost a half-century — and the last 
time had been more than twenty-five years earlier. 
At a structural level, reducing the scope of Article I powers to regu-
late does have asymmetrical political consequences even beyond which 
party controls Congress.391  It systematically restrains Congress’s ability 
to develop creative, innovative solutions to regulate challenging, novel, 
contested policy issues — from political corruption and cronyism to in-
terest group capture and economic power.  Indeed, the CFPB was de-
liberately designed in order to insulate the agency from capture by fi-
nancial institutions — directly and indirectly via a captured Congress 
or captured President.392  Holding Congress to only the agency designs 
it adopted centuries ago (and taking a blinkered view of those designs 
too) will have significant consequences — and those consequences align 
with ideological divides between conservatives and progressives on po-
litical economy. 
Each of these four possibilities is speculative, of course, and partic-
ularly as to motivations.  But they are not mutually exclusive.  It is 
possible that with decades of Democratic control of Congress and power 
over the legislative agenda, conservatives believed that Congress passed 
laws that regulated the economically powerful too aggressively and  
created agencies to implement those laws that were staffed by liberal 
personnel.  Unable to eliminate these agencies altogether through the 
legislative process, strong Republican Presidents could aggressively  
exercise the powers of appointment and administrative oversight to 
break down these agencies.  Democratic Presidents would have a harder 
time building them back up, for both political and institutional reasons.  
Premeditated or not, the result of these interlocking asymmetries would 
be to undo the New Deal–era administrative state and its system of po-
litical economy. 
CONCLUSION 
“When should courts be responsible for designing federal adminis-
trative agencies?” Professor Aziz Huq has asked.393  The obvious answer, 
one might think, is never.  But between Free Enterprise Fund and Seila, 
the Supreme Court has now inserted itself into fiercely contested politi-
cal battles twice in a decade, and without terribly persuasive textual, 
structural, or historical reasoning.  The Court might not want to say so, 
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but “personnel is policy,” whether in the specific choices of individuals 
or in structuring their offices. 
My aim in this Comment has been to show that Seila is a political 
case in more ways than one.  The CFPB emerged and persisted in spite 
of a relentless assault on its existence.  That battle took it to the Supreme 
Court, where it met an impressive decades-long effort to articulate and 
legitimize the unitary executive theory and a preclusive removal power.  
Those legal theories, in turn, might depend on normative views of the 
Constitution, and they likely have asymmetric political effects — though 
not the first-order effects that characterize many “political” issues that 
make it to the Supreme Court.  Debates over constitutional structure 
might seem esoteric, with discussions of obscure historical events and 
attempts to divine meaning from a text that is at once concise and gen-
eral.  But that does not necessarily make them any less political than 
cases that normally carry that moniker. 
